World War II

The 82d Infantry Division was called to active duty on March 25, 1942, at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, under the command of Major General Omar N. Brandley. On August 15, 1942, the division took wings as the 82d Airborne-becoming the U.S. Army’s first airborne division-now commanded by Major General Mathew B. Ridgway. At the same time, half of 82d Soldiers were used in the formation of a second airborne division-the “Screaming Eagles” of the 101st Airborne Division.

In October, the 82d was sent to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to conduct airborne training. On October 14, the 82d absorbed the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which had formed May 1 at Fort Bragg. By the time they went overseas, the 82d would consist of 325th Glider Infantry Regiment and the 504th and 505th Parachute Infantry Regiments.

At Fort Bragg, the All Americans trained vigorously. General Ridgway vowed his division would become the best division in the Army, airborne or otherwise. Later, on V-E Day, many observers agreed the 82d had met their leaders challenge.

While the pioneering paratroopers stood up, hooked up and leaped from a C-47 transport planes, glider borne troops were at work in the 15-man WACO-CG4A glider-towed by the transport planes. Half of the division troops went into battle by glider.

In the spring of 1943, the 82d All Americans became the first airborne division sent overseas landing in Casablanca, North Africa, on May 10, 1943. From there, they moved by rail to Oujda and then by truck to Kairouan, Tunisia. That would be their departure point for the Division’s first combat drop-the invasion of Sicily.

Sicily

Poised in the Mediterranean after the successful North African campaign, the Allied forces hoped to give Italy a kick in the boot by attacking Sicily in the mission code-named “HUSKY!” The Sicilian strategy had been planned in January 1943 at the high-level conference in Morocco attended by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Confident of success in Africa and cognizant that a cross-channel invasion of Europe was more that a year off, the conference targeted Sicily as a stepping-stone to Italy, whose troops had been performing Axis occupational duties in their country and the Balkans. With Italy weakened, Germany would be forced to spread its troops more thinly.

“HUSKY” called for four separate airborne operations, two by the British and two by the “All American.” To ensure surprise and to guard the paratroopers from antiaircraft activity, the operations would occur during the pre-dawn hours of July 10. With the aid of a nearly full moon, airborne troopers would begin landing before midnight on July 9 to be in place before the arrival of amphibious forces in the morning. Approximately 200,000 Allied troops were scheduled to participate in the initial assault-comparable in size to what the Axis forces were estimated to have serving in Sicily.

The 82d’s objective, HUSKY I, was led by paratroopers from the 505th, under the capable leadership of Colonel James M. “Jumping Jim” Gavin. Organized as a Regimental Combat Team, the 505th was to parachute into an egg-shaped area around Gela on the southern shore. They would then close off the roads leading to beaches and secure the drop zone for future use. Especially important near the DZ was enemy-held “Objective Y” – a series of 16 concrete “pillboxes” from which German gunners controlled movement on nearby roads.

The 82d’s second task, Called “HUSKY II,” would involve delivering the 504th Combat Team, lead by Colonel Reuben Tucker, a night later to the DZ secured by the 505th.

The All Americans trained intensively day and night for the mission. Exactly one month before the airborne assault was to begin; a party led by Colonel Gavin flew to the Southern coast of Sicily, where the flight checkpoints came into view on the moonlit night. It was assumed the same checkpoints would be readily visible a month later when the moon was in the same phase.

To avoid “friendly fire” from the hundreds of Allied ships heading toward Sicily, the pilots of the airborne assault were to fly a long, circuitous route from Africa. They would first go to Malta, then to the southwest corner of Sicily, then back out to sea to avoid shore batteries. Upon reaching the mouth of the Acate River, they were to head inland to the DZ. All this- 415 miles rather then a straight-shot 250-at 200 feet about water, to avoid detection, before rising to 600 feet for the final approach to the DZs.

Once over land, Colonel Gavin’s plane banked to the right to correct the line of fight. To the pilots behind, this appeared to be the pre-arranged signal to release their troops. On came the green jump signal lights.

When Colonel Gavin and the men in formation with him jumped, they landed about 20 miles east of the DZ. Many of the others, further off course, landed in the British zone, about 60 miles east of the DZ. Only about 15 percent of the combat team had been delivered to the correct DZ, and even they were widely spread apart. Nonetheless, considerable successes were achieved on the ground by small of lost paratroopers. They cut every telephone line they found, devastating the communications that would be required by the enemy to devise a counterattack. Small groups of paratroops conducted ambushes. A hundred brave paratroopers of the 1-505th, whose other comrades had in the British sector, secured even Objective Y, the deadly pillboxes.

Gavin’s paratroopers repulsed German counterattacks by the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, elite German Unit. At Biazza Ridge, the 505th troopers fought courageously against German tanks and Infantry. Though losses were high, the paratroopers held their ground. Later Mark VI Tiger tanks, made of four-inch thick steel, attacked. The American bazookas could penetrate only three inches of steel, but with determination and again, albeit at high cost.

The Sicilian campaign closed to mixed reviews. General D. Eisenhower, commander of U.S. troops, was concerned about unpredictable landings of airborne troopers who initially were not together on land in sufficient numbers to prevent significant movement by enemy tanks. He and other critics noted that the 2,800 paratroopers landed over a 65-mile area. General George S. Patton, however, reported that he gained 48 hours in his ground advance as the far-flung paratroopers scurried to their positions.

Years later, someone who knew best - General Kurt Student- Chief of staff of all German parachute forces from 1943-45 spelled out the importance of the 82d’s blocking action. Student noted that the 82d Airborne Division had prevented the German Panzers from reaching the beachhead in Sicily, thus denying the Axis troops the opportunity of driving the Allies back into the sea. He testified, “I attribute the entire success of the Allies Sicilian operation to the delaying of German reserves until sufficient forces had been landed by the sea to assist the counterattacks of our defending forces.”