On the morning of July 3rd, the 82nd
Airborne Division and other divisions were unleashed on a drive to the
southwest. Our 82nd objective was La Haye du Puits. General Collins had
finally taken the port of Cherbourg, which was badly needed to bring in
supplies for our forces. Eisenhower could now direct his armies to drive
east into France. But first there was a main effort to cut off the German
forces located between American forces and the British and Canadian forces
to the north. We were in a defensive position to the northeast of La
Daudaie. Our first day's objective on July 3rd was to drive southwest
about 6,000 yards, just short of Blanchelande and clear the left slope of
Hill 131 with the 505th to take the hill. The following day, July 4th, we
were to take Hill 95, about 4,000 yards to our southwest. On the morning
of July 3rd, Colonel Lindquist had me give the attack order. The 505th
would be on our right and the 325th would be on our left. Our Regimental
attack was 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast with the 1st Battalion following
in close reserve. The attack went well until I think I heard over my radio
that LTC Shanley, leading the 2nd Battalion, had tripped the wire to a
bouncing betty and caught a ball in the back of his neck. The loss of
Colonel Shanley was critical leaving only an inexperienced officer to lead
the Battalion. I requested and received permission from Colonel Lindquist
to go forward and lead the Battalion. I immediately went forward to the
2nd Battalion, which was involved in cleaning up a German defensive
position. The Battalion was unorganized and some men were looting the
captured Germans.
I sent Colonel Shanley back to the medics and proceeded to
get the Battalion organized and moving toward our objective for the day.
We closed on it about an hour before dark. After my 2nd Battalion had
proceeded to about 1,000 yards short of our objective I heard firing to
our rear. I took one man with me to backtrack and see what was holding up
the 1st Battalion. As we took a bend in the dirt road and looked down the
hill, we could see Germans in a deep drainage ditch firing at our oncoming
1st Battalion, the Regimental reserve. My runner and I knocked off a
couple of them from our hillside position and they started crawling off in
the ditch of the oncoming 1st Battalion. I grabbed the point rifle squad
and directed them in cutting off the escaping Germans. We captured 25 or
26 Germans led by an SS lieutenant. I still have his P38 pistol. Major
Warren came up, saw the last of the action, and remarked that I would make
a good platoon leader. These Germans had moved laterally to get out from
in front of the 505th Regiment on our right. If Major Warren, the 1st
Battalion Commander, had maintained contact with the leading 2nd
Battalion, as he should have, there would have been no room for the
Germans to move laterally from in front of the 505th, and I explained this
to him.
After seeing to it that the 2nd Battalion was in a good
defensive position for the night, there was still a half hour of daylight
remaining, so I set out to make a reconnaissance for the following
morning, July 4th, at dawn. I found that there was an open valley about
one quarter mile across between us and the Germans. I moved to the left
forward edge of a wooded area, crawled behind a stone wall, pulled a rock
out of the wall, and with my field glasses, had spotted two German gun
positions on Hill 95. About that time one of the men came walking up to my
position and I called to him to get down as the Germans could see him. He
kept coming and then ran like hell when the Germans put an 88 round into
the wall just ahead of him. I never learned who the soldier was. I don't
think he wanted me to know. As soon as darkness closed in, I left my
observation post and returned to the Battalion, which was located on the
back slope of a small rise. I talked on a field telephone with Colonel
Lindquist and told him that for the attack next morning I was going to
move the Battalion to the left into a tree-covered ridge leading to Hill
95 and not have to cross the open valley and be subject to direct fire
from the German guns on Hill 95.
I had no sooner hung the phone back on a tree when the
Germans lucked out. They put a mortar round into the top of the tree. I
think I heard it coming but took a dive too late. I was hit in the back by
two shell fragments. It felt like someone had stuck a fence post in my
back and all I could do was lay there and cuss and think of all the times
they were shooting at me and missed. They finally lobbed one over the hill
and got me. Doctor Montgomery and the medics got to me right away, taped
my chest tight closing the wound so that I would not have a blowhole and
collapsed lung. They called Regiment for a jeep and put me in the front
seat with the driver. On the way to the hospital we stopped briefly at the
Regimental CP and I had a few words with Colonel Lindquist but I could not
talk very well. When we arrived at the field hospital, there was a ground
fog. I put my foot down to dismount from the jeep, saw two orderlies
coming with a stretcher, and I can only remember falling to the ground.
The next thing I remember two doctors were trying to take an x-ray of my
chest. I was bare from my waist up but still wearing my pants. I had the
shakes and could not hold still for the x-ray. When I came to after
surgery. Major General Ridgeway was sitting on a stool by my cot holding
my hand. He was talking to me but I do not remember what he said as I was
only semiconscious. |