|
The
Grave bridge was considered initially the most important and one
regiment was committed to it. There was where the first link-up
would be made, and of course was made on the third day after our
landing. The bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal were to me an obvious
necessity, based on my experience in the past, particularly the
bridges over the Merderet River in Normandy, when I lost a major
part of the 507th Parachute Infantry because of my lack of foresight
in seizing bridges that would enable us to maintain some tactical
integrity within the division. It was obvious that we had to get
bridges across the Maas-Waal Canal. Our G-2 estimate of the
situation indicated that the major German reaction would be from the
Reichswald, up the main highway via Mook and Molenhoek to Nijmegen.
If the Germans succeeded in driving in here we were in serious
trouble. Seizure and retention of the bridges in strength on the
Canal would add to the defensive strength opposing such an enemy
effort.
The
importance of the Nijmegen bridge was, I believe, appreciated by all
concerned from the outset. Due to the tremendous sector that the
division was to hold, it was first considered best to not attack the
Nijmegen bridge until all other objectives had been captured, and
the division well reorganized and well in hand. About 48 hours
prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up
well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, Commanding the 508th
Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the
Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very
close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself
against the Reichswald. The glider landing zone was between Wyler
and Grosbeek and the Reichswald. Here all of the division artillery
was due to land on D-plus-1. It had to be secured. Considerable
latitude was therefore given to the Commanding Officer of the 508th
Parachute Infantry on how far to commit himself in the direction of
the Nijmegen bridge, and he appreciated the fact that the bridge was
to be seized immediately if this was practicable. So I personally
directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was
cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the
city.
Shortly after landing, through an agent in the Dutch underground, he
was led to believe that the battalion could be successfully led
through back streets of the city to close proximity with the bridge,
where it could be seized. An effort was made to do this and, as a
result, the battalion became very heavily engaged at close quarters
in city streets under very difficult circumstances. At daylight I
talked to the Battalion Commander in the city and directed that he
withdraw from close proximity to the bridge and reorganize. In the
meantime, in order to take advantage of what we believed was a
tactical opportunity, "G" Company was directed to move by the right,
advancing from the high ground along the road towards the bridge,
and grab the southern end of it. From intelligence reports we had
just received, this appeared practicable, and although it would
normally be well beyond the capabilities of a company, the Battalion
Commander of the third battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry, Colonel
Mendez, was an especially fine combat leader and "G" Company was an
unusually good parachute company. If the coup could succeed they
could do the job. Of course, as the situation developed, by
mid-morning of D-plus-1, the German reaction from the Reichswald was
so violent, intense and strong that the forces committed towards
Nijmegen had to be withdrawn. The 508 made an attack towards the
Reichswald and cleared the
2
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
|
