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landing zone. They just
succeeded in doing this in time for the first gliders to land.
This particular maneuver, I believe, has few parallels and could
have been executed only by extremely capable troops and unusual
combat leadership on the part of the regimental, battalion and
company commanders involved. The regiment was being attacked by
superior numbers from several directions, but it managed to
disengage in Nijmegen and attack and drive the Germans from the
landing zone area. At the same time, it was attacking and
seizing the northern bridge over the Haas-Waal Canal, as well as
providing contact with other units and security of its entire
perimeter, which was now approximately eight miles long. The
answer to your questions, specifically, therefore is the capture
of Nijmegen and the highway bridge was considered part of the
initial objective if, after arrival on the ground, I considered
it possible. This much latitude was given me by British Airborne
Corps. Whether or not it was possible I could only determine
after attempting it. This was done and, as the operation has
shown, it took the combined efforts of the 504th Parachute
Infantry, one battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry, a
considerable number of the Dutch resistance, which I had armed,
and two battalions of the British Guards Armored Division.
Your
next question - What person, staff or headquarters made the
decision to apportion the weight of the 82d Airborne Division to
the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?: This
decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.
And the next question - Why was more emphasis initially placed
on the bridges across the Maas River and the Maas-Waal Canal
rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?: If the bridge at Nijmegen
were seized and held, and the opposition were tough enough, it
would have been a division operation in itself, such as
developed at Arnhem. If the high ground were not held, it would
have to have been captured before the British could succeed in
establishing contact in force with the Nijmegen bridge forces.
Since the high ground had to be captured, the bridges over the
Maas River and the Maas-Waal Canal had to be captured so that
the British could gain contact with our troops on the high
ground. I do not believe there is any doubt in my mind or in the
mind of any of the participants of this engagement as to the
relative importance of our objectives. I want to again emphasize
the necessity of seizing and holding dominating terrain in close
proximity to the bridges. Physical possession of the bridges
themselves is nothing if the terrain dominating those bridges is
completely held by the enemy. In fact, he could have destroyed
the bridges by shellfire or at least denied their use constantly
if we permitted him to hold the high ground. This concept
becomes elemental and very clear on the ground, although I
suppose from this distance and from the map it needs some
explaining.
Your next question - Who made the decision to send the first
battalion of the 508th into Nijmegen on the evening of September
17th? I made the decision. Sufficient latitude was given the
Commanding Officer of the 508th that he could have held back
this battalion if it appeared necessary in order to maintain the
integrity of his own portion of the division area.
Next - was Company "G" ordered to move on the bridge, or merely
set up roadblocks outside of town? It was ordered to move on the
bridge. It
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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